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Abstract. We introduce a modular framework for market making. It
combines cost-function based automated market makers with bandit al-
gorithms. We obtain worst-case profits guarantee’s relative to the best
in hindsight within a class of natural ”overround” cost functions . This
combination allow us to have distribution-free guarantees on the regret
of profits while preserving the bounded worst-case losses and computa-
tional tractability over combinatorial spaces of the cost function based
approach. We present simulation results to better understand the prac-
tical behaviour of market makers from the framework.
1 Introduction
We propose a framework for profit-driven market making on state-contingent
claims. It provides distribution-free guarantees on the regret of worst-case prof-
its within those that can be obtained by a natural class of ”overround” cost
function-based automated market makers. Worst-case profits are natural for a
distribution-free analysis over outcomes, while ”overround” cost functions are
natural way to extend cost-functions to be able to obtain profits . The ”over-
round” can be considered as the price the market maker charges for providing
a unit of liquidity, since it is the cost of purchasing continent claims to obtain a
unit payoff under any state of the world.
The market makers pricing problem for assets with state-contingent payoffs
can be decomposed into two sub-problems;
1. increasing the price of an asset as the proportion of outstanding contracts
in it increases relative to those of other assets, so as to limit potential losses
from it’s outcome occurring.
2. Finding the magnitude of the sum of prices that maximises the profits that
can be gained by the market maker, the overround.
The first sub-problem is well handled by the cost function literature, provid-
ing strong worst-case guarantees. We provide an overview of the mechanics of the
cost function approach in 3.1. The second sub-problem has a explore vs exploit
tradeoff at it’s core: the higher the prices for assets caused by a larger overround
while increasing the profitability of a given set of contracts sold, reduces the de-
mand for contracts. Conversely, lower prices due to a smaller overround reduce
the profitability of any given contract bundle sold but can lead to higher demand
for contracts. There is thus no a priori correct size for the overround. Given a
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choice of overround the market maker only observes the demand for assets at that
level, so there is a need for it to explore the profitability of various levels that
the overround can be set at, while selecting the profit maximising overround
as it becomes apparent with sufficiently high probability. This exploration vs
exploration tradeoff is well handled by the literature on bandit problems.
We consider a setting where on each unit of time the market maker commits
to using a given overround cost function, and changes this cost function between
time periods. The framework works by mapping the size of the overround into
the bandit’s arm, and the change in worst case profits in a given period to the
rewards of the bandit algorithm. This combination allow us to have distribution-
free guarantees from the bandit literature and computational tractability over
combinatorial spaces of the cost-function based approach. The modular approach
has the advantage that it allows us to build on results in these two growing
literatures, and to bring future developments in their algorithms and analisys
into to market making domain.
1.1 Examples
To motivate and clarify the two aspects, price discovery with bounded loss, and
profit-maximising sum of assetsprices (overround) it is useful to consider two
extreme situations the market maker can be faced with.
To understand the importance of the cost cost function, one can consider a
situation in which in each period there is a trader who has perfect knowledge of
the state of the world that will occur. It is important that even as in each time
period trader buys the asset that will occur, in any quantity, the total exposure
of the market maker be bounded, so as to be able to bound it’s worst case loss.
In this situation the optimal market maker is one that charges a price of 1 for
all assets, since he incurs 0 loss, and there is no way to profit from the sequence
of identical traders with perfect knowledge of the outcome.
To understand the importance of the explore/exploit tradeoff in finding the
profit maximising sum of prices, one can consider the situation on which traders
are drawn form a symmetric belief distribution with a known centre and the
relevant state of the world is a binary variable. The market maker must still
learn the right amount to separate the price of the two assets so as to extract
maximal profits. If we further specialise the situation to one where the beliefs are
fully concentrated on two points. At each time period we have a choice ov how
far from the known centre to separate the two prices (this is equivalent to the
overround), and we either observe the full demand, and thus know that it may
still be possible to have a higher overround while attracting the same amount
of trade, or we observe no trade and thus learn that the optimal overround is
smaller.
2 Related Literature
The market maker as a way to elicit information from traders has been studied
in an extensive literature on cost function based automated market makers mo-
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tivated by prediction markets [11, 12, 7]. By equating outcomes in the market
setting with experts in the learning setting, and the trades made in the market
with the losses observed by the learning algorithm Chen and Vaughan [8? ] a
strikeing mathematical equivalence exists between cost function based predic-
tion markets and regularised follow the leader online learning. Further work has
shown has models in models with traders that have stochastically drawn beliefs
correspond to mirror descent [? ]. The learning that takes place in these cases
can be seen to be taking place over the probabilities of the events. In these cases
the market maker can be seen as subsidising trade in securities contingent on an
outcome the traders might not have exogenous reasons to hedge onto, as a way
of paying to extract their beliefs about the likelihood of the events.
The market maker as an agent motivated to make profits by offering liquidity
to traders and attempting to maximise profit also has an extensive literature,
through it has until recently remained separate from that on prediction market
making. In [9] an optimal market maker when trader beliefs are symmetric is
presented, in [5] the price process is assumed to be mean reverting. Learning
again can be considered to be taking place in this case, but the learning is over
buying and selling prices will balance the supply and demand and extract the
largest profits. Cost function based automated market maker with prices that
sum to greater than one have been studied in [17, 1, 16] which implies these
market makers that can turn a profit. These market makers do not, however,
optimise the amount of profits they extract from traders. The Bayesian Market
Maker of [3] does not provide worst-case guarantees, nor this it optimise it’s
profits, but rather provides narrow spreads in equilibrium. The optimal policy
for market makers in equities is studied by [? ]. Using stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming, [13] show that a threshold inventory control policy is optimal with
respect to an exponential utility criterion and a mean-variance trade-off model.
Cost function based market makers for prediction markets are based on se-
quentially shared proper scoring rules. These are myopically incentive compati-
ble: that is if traders do not consider the effects of their trades on other players
beliefs or on the market makers future actions then proper scoring rules incen-
tivise players to reveal their true beliefs. If traders can interact multiple times
with the market maker and act strategically, proper scoring rules are not enough
to incentivise traders reveal their true beliefs [6]. Incentive compatible bandit
mechanisms are studied in [10]. The focus of this paper is where an (possibly
adversarially arranged) sequence of traders get to interact only once with the
market maker, which is sufficient to make the proper-scoring rule interpretation
of the cost-function based market makers incentive compatible.
Using a bandit framework to attack a pricing problem goes back in the eco-
nomics literature to [18] who considers the case with discounting. Special cases
of the problem has more recently been analysed using modern methods by Bes-
bes and Zeevi [2]. A specific version of online posted-price auctions have been
analysed using adversarial bandits by Kleinberg and Leighton [14].
4 Nicola´s Della Penna and Mark D. Reid
3 Framework
We now give a high level overview of our bandit market making framework. De-
tails and assumptions about the various components are given in the subsections
below.
We consider a setting with n mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive
outcomes, and T time periods of trading. At each time period t = 1, . . . , T
the market maker has an obligation vector qt and must choose a cost function
Ct from a predefined set C which defines its pricing behaviour for that round.
Traders sequentially interact with the market maker by buying portfolios of
contracts at prices set by the market maker. The aggregate purchases st of the
sequence of traders that arrives during a period t shifts the market maker’s
obligation vector to qt+1 = qt + st, its obligation vector for the beginning of
round t+ 1.
As described in the introduction, the explore vs. exploit trade off the market
maker faces in choosing a new cost function each round can be viewed as a
bandit problem. To make use of algorithms from the bandit literature and their
associated guarantees, we first formalize our cost function based market and
derive some basic results that will be needed in Section 4.
3.1 Cost functions
The pricing behaviour of a market maker is defined through a continuous cost
function C : Q → R+ where Q is a closed, bounded subset of Rn+. The cost
function assigns a monetary value C(q) to each market position or obligation
described by a vector q ∈ Q. The set Q represents the positions a market maker
using such a C is willing to take prior to trading. Each component qi is the total
size of the market maker’s obligation in case event i occurs.
If the market is in position q and a trader wants to buy a portfolio of s ∈ Rn+
shares, the price the trader must pay is C(q+ s)−C(q). This means the instan-
taneous price per share for each security i is ∂∂qiC(q) and can be summarised by
the gradient vector
pi(q) := ∇C(q) =
(
∂C(q)
∂q1
, . . . ,
∂C(q)
∂qn
)
.
More details about the properties and methods for constructing cost functions
can be found in [1].
It is important to note that our worst-case loss is bounded by the worst-
case loss of the cost-function that provides the most liquidity in the set under
consideration. The bandit algorithm guarantees we have vanishing regret relative
to the optimal fixed choice of C within our set.
Market maker value A market maker attempts to balance the income it
receives by selling contracts against the potential liabilities it faces when an
outcome occurs and the corresponding contracts must be honoured. Hence, we
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define the value Vq(C, i) of a market maker with cost-function C and market
position q when outcome i obtains to be
Vq(C, i) := C(q)−
〈
q, e(i)
〉
= C(q)− qi
where e(i) is the ith basis vector in Rn+ (i.e., e
(i)
j = 0 for i 6= j and e(i)i = 1). This
quantity is the difference between the total income the market maker obtained
by accepting trades to move to position q and the cost of those obligations should
outcome i occur. We abuse notation slightly and also define the value Vq(C, p)
where p ∈ ∆n to be
Vq(C, p) := Ei∼p[Vq(C, i)] = C(q)− 〈q, p〉
which is the difference between the total income of the market maker and the
expected cost given a distribution p over outcomes.
Assumptions and properties We put some natural restrictions on the cost
function, similar to those used by Abernethy et al. [1] and Othman and Sandholm
[16]:
C1 Convexity: C(λq + (1− λ)q′) ≤ λC(q) + (1− λ)C(q′) for all q, q′ ∈ Q and
all λ ∈ [0, 1].
C2 Monotonicity: C(q) ≥ C(q′) for all q, q′ ∈ Q such that q ≥ q′ (that is
qi ≥ q′i for i = 1 . . . n).
C3 Bounded Loss: supq∈Q maxi qi − C(q) <∞.
Since loss and value are complementary, we note that the bounded loss con-
dition can be equivalently written as a lower bound on the worst-case value of a
market maker.
C3’ Bounded Value: infq mini Vq(C, i) > −∞.
In addition to the above conditions, we also require that the cost function
always offer prices that are potentially profitable for the market-maker and have
bounded prices:
C4 Potentially Profitable:
∑n
i=1 pii(q) ≥ 1 for all q ∈ Q, and there exists a
q ∈ Q such that ∑ni=1 pii(q) > 1
C5 Bounded Prices: There exists a P < ∞ so that for all q ∈ Q the prices
pi(q) ∈ [0, P ]n.
These last two conditions are crucial for the rest of our analysis. The poten-
tially profitable condition C4 is similar to that of Othman et al. [17] and requires
that prices sum to greater than one for for some q and never to less than one.
That is, for some state of the quantity vector, the cost function should offer a set
of prices that if a uniform vector of assets is purchased by traders it will make
guarantee a profit for the market maker.
The bounded prices assumption C5 implies that the cost functions we con-
sider are Lipschitz continuous.
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Lemma 1. If C is continuously differentiable with bounded prices then for all
q, q′ ∈ Q ⊂ Rn+
|C(q)− C(q′)| ≤ P√n‖q − q′‖
Proof. The bounded prices assumption implies pi(q) = ∇C(q) ∈ [0, P ]n and
so ‖∇C(q)‖ ≤ P√n. By convexity of C we have for all q, q′ that C(q) ≥
C(q′) + 〈∇C(q′), q − q′〉. Without loss of generality, assume C(q′) ≥ C(q) so
then 〈∇C(q′), q′ − q〉 ≥ C(q′) − C(q) ≥ 0 and by Cauchy-Schwarz we have
P
√
n‖q′ − q‖ ≥ |C(q′)− C(q)| as required.
Overround Cost Functions Families of potentially profitable cost functions
can easily be constructed from a given cost function C with fair prices, by charg-
ing a fixed multiple a > 1 of the prices for C. We term these overround cost
functions for the base function C. When discussing such families we will always
assume or show that the base function satifies conditions C1–C5.
For example, if C(q) = b log
∑
i exp(qi/b) is the well known logarithmic mar-
ket scoring rule (LMSR) [11] with fixed parameter b, we can construct the single
parameter family C = {aC : a ∈ [1,∞)}. In this case, the prices charged by some
C = aC ∈ C at market position q are simply
pii(q) = a
exp(qi/b)∑
i exp(qi/b)
which is just a times the prices piLMSR(q) given by the LMSR cost function with
the same liquidity parameter b.
We will refer to this family of potentially profitable cost functions built upon
the LMSR as the overround LMSR cost functions. It is straightforward to verify
that overround LMSR cost functions satisfy conditions C1-C5. Any LMSR cost
function satisfies C1-C3 (see, for example, [1]) and multiplication by a constant
a does not affect its convexity, monotonicity, or boundedness. Condition C4
holds because
∑
i pii(q) = a
∑
i pi
LMSR
i (q) = a > 1 for all q ∈ Q. Similarly,
the overround LMSR functions have bounded prices because piLMSR(q) ∈ [0, 1]n
implies pi(q) ∈ [0, a]n and so choosing P = a witnesses condition C5.
Cost Function Distance When treating a set of cost functions as arms in a
bandit game in Section 4, we require a metric measure of “closeness” between
cost functions. The most convenient measure for our purposes is the metric
derived from the supremum norm, which takes the maximal difference in costs
assigned to any market position by two given cost functions.
Formally, we define the metric
d∞(C,C ′) := sup
q∈Q
|C(q)− C ′(q)|
and consider two cost functions to be close if d∞(C,C ′) is small. It is easy to
establish that d∞ is indeed a (pseudo-)metric: d∞(C,C ′) = d∞(C ′, C) ≥ 0 with
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d∞(C,C) = 0 and the triangle inequality carries over from the triangle inequality
of |x− x′| on the reals.
For overround cost functions this distance behaves naturally – scaling with
the difference in overround. Specifically, if aC and a′C are two overround cost
functions for the base function C then d∞(aC, a′C) = |a− a′| supq∈Q |C(q)|.
4 Bandit Market Making
Before showing how for profit market making can be viewed as a bandit problem
we first briefly outline bandit problems in general and point out some salient
results. The remainder of this section then motivates a natural reward function
that allows market making to be cast as a bandit problem. We then show how
this particular choice of reward function satisfies the conditions of a theorem
of Kleinberg [15] for a fully adversarial continuous-armed bandit problem, thus
allowing us to apply this result to our market making problem.
4.1 Bandit Problems
A bandit problem1 consists of a game played over T rounds. In each round t the
player must choose an action at (or “arm”) from a predefined set of alternatives
A. After each choice the player is given a reward rt(at) and play continues to
the next round. The player’s aim is to accrue the largest total reward at the end
of the T rounds. Crucially, the rewards for the unplayed actions are not revealed
each round so the player is forced to balance exploring unplayed actions (in case
they have larger rewards) and repeatedly playing those actions which have given
high rewards in the past.
When analysing algorithms that play bandit games, a central quantity is the
regret of a particular sequence of actions a1:T := a1, . . . , aT . This is the difference
between the total reward R(a1:T ) the player received and the best total reward
that would have been received if a single arm were played repeatedly. That is,
the regret of the sequence a1:T is
Regret(a1:T ) :=
T∑
t=1
rt(at)−max
a∈A
T∑
t=1
rt(a).
Typical analyses of bandit problems derive sublinear (i.e., o(T )) bounds on
the worst case regret for particular algorithms and under various assumptions
about the power of the player’s adversary when choosing the sequence of reward
functions r1, . . . , rT . The structure of the action space A (e.g., finite, convex,
etc.) and the set of reward functions the adversary can choose from also play an
important role in the type of results that are obtained.
For reasons described in the next subsection, we will restrict our attention to
what are called fully adversarial bandit problems on continuous action spaces.
1 The reader wanting more details about bandit problems and an excellent overview
of the related literature is referred to [4].
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The latter condition just means that the set of actions available to the player is
uncountable and typically some compact subset of Rd. The former term means
that the choice of reward function at each round can depend on the history of
choices made by the player.
Because of the difficulty of this setting, there are relatively few results. Those
that work on action spaces that are a subset of Rd tend to place strong restric-
tions on the form of the reward functions, such as requiring them to be linear or
convex.
The one result we are aware of that applies to more general reward functions
on continuous action spaces is by Kleinberg [15]. This only requires a technical
condition on the set of reward functions that broadly says that they do not vary
too wildly. Formally, a function f : S → R is said to be uniformly locally Lipschitz
with constant L > 0, exponent α ∈ (0, 1], and restriction δ > 0 whenever f
satisfies, for all u, u′ ∈ S with |u−u′| ≤ δ, |f(u)− f(u′)| ≤ L|u−u′|α. Following
Kleinberg, we denote this class of functions ulL(α,L, δ). Given this definition,
we now state Kleinberg’s result:
Theorem 1 ([15]). Let S be a bounded subset of R and Γ ⊂ ulL(α,L, δ) be a set
of uniformly locally Lipschitz reward functions r : S → [0, 1] Then there exists
an algorithm CAB that achieves regret O
(
T
α+1
2α+1 log
α
2α+1 T
)
against adaptive
adversaries.
We now describe how to interpret market making in this setting and introduce
a parameterised reward function for market making that satisfies the uniformly
locally Lipschitz condtion.
4.2 Market Making as a Bandit Problem
When viewed as a bandit problem, the task of choosing a sequence of cost func-
tions C1, . . . , Ct ∈ C imposes a number of constraints on the type of algorithm
we can use to solve it.
One unavoidable difficulty is the inherent path dependence of the market
making problem. In any realistic market scenario, each choice of cost function
would yield different amounts of trade. Given a fixed obligation vector qt ∈ Q,
this means two different choices of Ct will result in different vectors qt+1 in the
subsequent round. This means that any sequence of reward functions that takes
into account both the choice of cost function and the obligation vector must
necessarily depend on the history of cost function choices. Thus, any interpre-
tation of market making as bandit problem must assume fully adversarial (i.e.,
non-independent) choices of rewards.
The second main difficulty is due to the richness of actions that the market
maker can take. In its most general form, C could be the set of all cost functions
for some fixed domain Q that meet conditions C1–C5. However, this is too rich
a class of actions to be handled by any existing adaptive bandit results that we
are aware of and restricting attention to finite C seems too restrictive, as the
natural scale of the changes in the overround that should be searched over is a
priori unknown.
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To the best of our knowledge, the largest class of actions for which adaptive
regret guarantees are available for non-linear and non-convex rewards are for
those in Theorem 1. That is, the action space must be (isomorphic to) a bounded
subset of R. A natural class of cost functions C that map to such an action
space are the overround cost functions described in Section 3.1. In particular, we
will restrict our attention to overround cost functions with bounded overround
parameter. That is, C = {aC : a ∈ [1, A]} for some A < ∞ and choice of base
cost function C. By identifying each cost function aC ∈ C with a ∈ [1, A] we
meet the requirement of Theorem 1 that the action space be a bounded subset
of R.
4.3 Reward Function
The final piece in our interpretation is the class of reward functions for the
bandit problem. We do so by first defining a state- and trade-dependent reward
function rq(C; s) for cost function C, state q, and trades s. We show that this
function has a number of key properties and then use it to derive the class
R = {rq(C; s) : q ∈ Q, s ∈ Rn+, q + s ∈ Q}. The properties of rq(C; s) are then
used to show that R is uniformly locally Lipschitz with α = 1 and thus meets
the condtions of Theorem 1.
The state- and trade-dependent reward we proposed is simply the difference
between the worst-case expected values of the market maker before and after
trading. Worst case profits are the natural distribution free measure of profits.
The change in their value in a given period is thus a natural way to reward the
bandit for the trades that occur during that period.
Formally, the reward for using cost function C in state q for trades s is
rq(C; s) := min
p∈∆n
Vq+s(C, p)− min
p′∈∆n
Vq(C, p
′). (1)
We now show that this reward functions behaviour is reasonable.
Theorem 2. The reward function rq(C; s) defined in (1) has the following prop-
erties:
R0 Zero Calibrated: For all C, q the reward function satisfies rq(C; 0) = 0.
R1 Path Independent: For all C, q, s1, and s2 the reward function must satisfy
rq(C; s1 + s2) = rq+s1(C; s2) + rq(C; s1).
R2 Overround Compatible: For all q = k.1 and s = k′.1 with k, k′ ≥ 0,
and homogenous cost-function C with overround α ( i.e., C(k.1) = k.C(1) =
k.(1 + α)) the reward satisfies
rq(C; s) = k
′.α
Proof. R0 holds trivially since when s = 0 the two minimisations in (1) are
identical and thus cancel leaving rq(C; 0) = 0.
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R1 is shown by observing that
rq+s1(C; s2) + rq(C; s1) = min
p
Vq+s1+s2(C, p)−min
p′
Vq+s1(C, p
′)
+ min
p′′
Vq+s1(C, p
′′)−min
p′′′
Vq(C, p
′′′)
= min
p
Vq+s1+s2(C, p)−min
p′′′
Vq(C, p
′′′)
=rq(C; s1 + s2)
since the middle two terms are identical optimisations and hence cancel.
To establish R2 we first observe that the value of a cost-function C and
position q is independent of p when q = k.1 for some k ≥ 0. This is because
Vq(C, p) = C(q)−〈q, p〉 = C(q)− k. 〈1, p〉 = C(q)− k. If C is homogeneous then
for such q we have C(q) = C(k.1) = k.C(1) and so Vq(C, p) = k.(C(1) − 1) for
all p. So for such C, q and for s = k′.1 we have
rq(C; s) = min
p
Vq+s(C, p)−min
p′
Vq(C, p
′)
=(k + k′).(C(1)− 1)− k.(C(1)− 1)
=k′.(C(1)− 1)
where the second term in the last line is just the overround α for C.
R0-R2 were derived from considering how a reward function should relate to
the cost-function in cases when the uncertainty over outcomes is irrelevant or
not present. R0 guarantees that if a choice of cost-function results in no trading
then no reward is received. R1 ensures that the order of trades for a fixed cost-
function does not affect the overall reward. Much like path independence for
cost-functions themselves. R2 comes from the observation that if the market
maker is in a position with a value that is outcome independent (i.e., q = k.1)
and a trader buys an outcome independent bundle of shares s then the reward
should be exactly the overround for C on s (i.e., k′.α).
The next lemma gives a bound on how much rq(C; s) can vary as a function
of a perturbation in C and a change in s. This is need in Theorem ?? below to
establish the smoothness of the reward class R.
Lemma 2. For each choice of base function C0 with prices bounded by P and
A > 1 let C = {aC0 : a ∈ [1, A]}. Then the function rq(C; s) satisfies
|rq(C; s)− rq(C ′; s′)| ≤ 2d∞(C,C ′) + (A.P.
√
n+ 1)‖s− s′‖
for C,C ′ ∈ C and for all q ∈ Q and s, s′ ∈ Rn+ such that q+s ∈ Q and q+s′ ∈ Q.
Proof. Let q¯ := q + s and q¯′ := q + s′ and consider the difference
|rq(C; s)− rq(C ′; s′)| =|C(q¯)− C ′(q¯′) + [C ′(q)− C(q)] + [min
p′
〈p′, q¯′〉 −min
p
〈p, q¯〉]
≤ |C(q¯)− C ′(q¯′)|︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+ |C ′(q)− C(q)|︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
+ |min
p′
〈p′, q¯′〉 −min
p
〈p, q¯〉 |︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
.
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We now argue that each of the three terms are bounded by some multiple
of d∞(C,C ′) := supq∈Q |C(q)− C ′(q)|. Clearly, T2 ≤ d∞(C,C ′) by definition of
d∞. For T1 we see
T1 =|C(q¯)− C(q¯′) + C(q¯′)− C ′(q¯′)|
≤|C(q¯)− C(q¯′)|+ |C(q¯′)− C ′(q¯′)|
≤A.P.√n‖s− s′‖+ d∞(C,C ′).
The last term is by the definition of d∞, while the first term is because q¯− q¯′ =
s− s′ and Lemma 1, since every C ∈ C has prices bounded by A.P .
Finally, for T3 suppose without loss of generality that minp′ 〈p′, q¯′〉 ≥ minp 〈p, q¯〉
and that p∗ satisfies 〈p∗, q¯〉 = minp 〈p, q¯〉. Then T3 = minp′ 〈p′, q¯′〉 − 〈p∗, q¯〉 ≤
〈p∗, q¯′〉−〈p∗, q¯〉 = 〈p∗, s′ − s〉. Thus, by Cauchy-Schwarz, we have T3 ≤ ‖p∗‖‖s−
s′‖ and because ‖p‖ ≤ 1 for all p ∈ ∆n this gives T3 ≤ ‖s − s′‖. Putting the
above bounds together gives the required result.
4.4 The continuous case
To define a class of reward functions in terms of rq(C; s) we let R = {rq(C; s) :
q ∈ Q, s ∈ Rn+, q + s ∈ Q}. Each r ∈ R is a reward function for cost functions
with an implicit state vector q and trade vector s. The interpretation of this
class in a bandit context is that reward functions are drawn semi-adversarily in
that in any state q, an adversary is free to choose the trade vector s, resulting
in the selection of the reward function rq(C; s) ∈ R. However, in the subsequent
round, the adversary will then be forced to choose a reward function of the form
rq+s(C; s
′).
If we are to assume that the trades depend on the choice of cost function
then we need to be able to guarantee that this difference does not change too
rapidly if the choice of cost function only changes a small amount (as measured
by d∞). To achieve this, we further constrain the adversary assume that during
any round of trade the largest possible difference in trades the market maker
can face if choosing between using C or C ′ is bounded by K.d∞(C,C ′) for some
constant K. We will call this the d∞-smooth trades assumption and use it in the
statement of our main result.
With the above assumptions in place, the following result states that it is
possible to for a bandit market maker to achieve vanishing regret relative to a
single choice of overround cost function, given the previously discussed regularity
assumptions about the variability of trades with respect to choice of cost function
by the market maker. This means, despite not knowing what the distribution of
traders’ demands are it is possible for the bandit market maker to asymptotically
extract a comparable amount of expected profit as if the best cost function in
the class for traders with those demands was known in advance.
Theorem 3. Let A > 1, C0 be a fixed base cost function, and let Cover = {aC0 :
a ∈ [1, A]} be the family of overround cost functions with metric d∞(C,C ′) :=
supq∈Q |C(q)−C ′(q)|. Then there exists a bandit market maker (using the CAB
algorithm) that achieves regret O(T 2/3 log1/3 T ) against d∞-smooth trades.
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Proof. The proof of this theorem hinges on showing that the reward functions
R can be transformed into rewards for a bandit game that are [0, 1]-valued
and uniformly locally Lipschitz with α = 1. Once this is done, the algorithm
CAB can be used to choose arms a ∈ [1, A] corresponding to cost functions
C = aC ∈ Cover. The regret bound for the game over [1, A] then carries over to
the game on Cover.
To see that the reward functions in R can be mapped to functions with range
[0, 1], note that C0 is a continuous function over a closed, bounded set Q and
thus must be bounded by some B. Therefore and C = aC0 must also be bounded
by AB since a < A. Thus,
rq(C; s) = min
p
Vq+s(C, p)−min
p′
Vq(C, p
′) ≤ AB − 1 +K
where −K is the lower bound guaranteed by condition C3’ for the cost function
C0. A lower bound is similarly established and so every rq(C; s) takes on values
in some bounded range which can be mapped to [0, 1].
The uniformly local Lipschitz property for rewards from R holds due to
Lemma 1 and the d∞-smooth trades assumption. Specifically, if r = rq(·; s) and
r′ = rq(·; s′) are two reward function from R then Lemma 1 guarantees that
|r(C)−r′(C ′)| ≤ 2d∞(C,C ′)+(A.P.
√
n+1)‖s−s′‖ ≤ [2+S.(A.P.√n+1)]d∞(C,C ′)
since ‖s− s′‖ ≤ S.d∞(C,′ C) by the smoothness assumption. Thus, the class R
is uniformly locally Lipschitz with α = 1, as required.
The above result shows that the total reward of a market maker playing the
bandit strategy is not much worse (O(T 2/3 log T 1/3)) than the total reward for
the best single choice of cost function in hindsight. Since the reward at each
round measures the worst-case
5 Simulations
A discrete version of a bandit market maker was implemented, using a overround
LMSR as the cost function and EXP3 as the bandit algorithm. We explore
the behaviour of the cumulative guaranteed profits of this market maker in
simulations to asses it’s performance. All simulations are done by generating the
same sequence of traders with beliefs and budgets, they sequentially interact
with the market makers cost function once and purchase optimal bundles given
their budget and beliefs. The liquidity parameter b = 10. Each trader had a
unit budget, and one trader arrived on each time period. A range of values for
the overround was included, ranging from 1.05 to 1.8 by doubling the interval
between each. Beyond the bandit market maker, each of the market makers
in the comparator class was evaluated using the same sequence of traders. All
market makers had a uniform starting asset vector set at 0, and there where two
possible outcomes.
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5.1 IID trader beliefs
To evaluate the baseline behaviour of the market maker we simulate traders
beliefs being drawn from a uniform distribution in the range [0, 1] for 400 periods.
Note that the maximal possible profitability without knowledge of the individual
traders in the sequence demands is to set prices of 0.75 for both of the assets
(effectively an overround of 1.5) and not move them in response to trades. After
400 traders interact wight he market, half of them will have purchased shares, so
maximum profits are 100. It is interesting to note that despite an overround of
1.5 not being considered, and the liquidity being relatively limited (as opposed
to effectively infinite in the optimal case) the best overround market maker is
able to obtain 2/3 of the maximal profits, while the bandit market maker using
EXP3 obtains 2/5 of the maximum profits.
5.2 Adapting to a shock
To evaluate the performance of the market maker to a shock we again start
the market makers with a uniform price vector, but traders beliefs are initial
distributed uniformly in the range [0.15, 0.35] for the first 500 periods, after
that they switch to a regime in which they are uniformly drawn from the inter-
val [0.65, 0.85]. The initial adjustment of prices downwards towards the 0.25
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equilibrium during the first half is accompanied by a large potential worst
case loss. An adjustment in the opposite direction when the regime switches
in the midway point leads to a sequence of time periods during which all mar-
ket makers meet their upper bound of per period profits, since the prices are
very attractive to arriving traders who spend their entire budget, while the
worst case loss of the market maker remains unaffected as they are purchas-
ing the asset that was not purchased int he first half of the trading period.
6 Conclusion and future work
Our approach preserves the model-free worst case guarantees of the prediction
markets literature, while simultaneously being able to provide guarantees of
profit optimality, these profit optimal guarantees are, however, relative to a par-
ticular class of market makers. It would be interesting to understand in future
work how far this class of market makers can be from optimal within the set of
market makers that have bounded risk. The range of bandit algorithms in the
literature is ever growing, and further work in exploring which are best suited for
market making environments would also be of substantial interest. Evaluation of
market makers within this framework in real life for-profit market making would
naturally also be of interest.
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